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Husserl and Stein on the Phenomenology of Empathy: 
Perception and Explication*
Abstract
Within the phenomenological tradition, one frequently finds the bold claim that interper-
sonal understanding is rooted in a sui	generis form of intentional experience, most com-
monly labeled empathy (Einfühlung). The following paper explores this claim, emphasizing 
its distinctive character, and examining the phenomenological considerations offered in its 
defense by two of its main proponents, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. After offering in 
section 2 some preliminary indications of how empathy should be understood, I then turn to 
some characterizations of its distinctive structure, considering, in section 3, the Husserlian 
claim that certain forms of empathy are perceptual in nature, and in section 4, Stein’s insist-
ence that empathetic experience frequently involves explicating the other’s own intentional 
experiences. Section 5 will conclude by assessing the extent to which their analyses lead 
support to a conception of empathy as an intuitive experience of other minds.
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Introduction
Treatments	of	interpersonality	and	intersubjectivity	in	the	phenomenological	
tradition	have	unanimously	rejected	the	notion	that	understanding	and	relat-
ing	to	other	minds	and	persons	is	most	fundamentally	a	matter	of	inference,	
inner	 simulation,	 or	 projection.	 More	 positively,	 phenomenologists	 have	
classically	attempted	to	identify	and	describe	a	form	of	experience,	empathy	
(Einfühlung),	in	which	other	embodied	minds	are	grasped	as	such,	and	which	
more	complex	and	cognitive	forms	of	intersubjectivity	take	as	their	point	of	
departure.1	Such	an	approach	may	have	significant	implications	for	contem-
porary	discussions	of	social	cognition	and	interpersonal	understanding,	since	
if	correct	it	challenges	certain	assumptions	held	by	the	two	dominant	camps	
of	theory-theory	and	simulation-theory.	In	this	paper	I	will	show	how	certain	
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1
This	line	of	thought	need	not	be	committed	to	
the	idea	that	the	concrete	encounter	with	the	
other	could	not	be	preceded	by	more	funda-
mental	 forms	 of	 intersubjectivity,	 but	 rather	
that	empathy	precedes	all	other	forms	of	 in-
terpersonal understanding.	 For	 two	Husser-
lian	accounts	of	pre-empathic	intersubjectiv-
ity,	see	Zahavi	(2001)	and	Steinbock	(1995).
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analyses	 from	Husserl’s	 Ideen II	 and	Stein’s	Zum Problem der Einfühlung	
mark	out	the	contours	of	an	account	of	empathy	which	distinguishes	it	sharply	
from	both	 imaginative	simulation	and	analogizing	 inference.	After	offering	
in	section	2	some	preliminary	indications	of	how	empathy	should	be	under-
stood,	I	will	turn	to	some	characterizations	of	its	phenomenological	structure,	
considering,	 in	section	3,	 the	Husserlian	claim	that	within	 the	personalistic	
attitude	empathy	can	be	understood	as	a	perception,	and	in	section	4,	Stein’s	
insistence	that	empathy	accomplishes	an	explication	of	the	other’s	own	inten-
tional	experiences.	Section	5	will	conclude	by	assessing	the	extent	to	which	
their	 analyses	 lead	 support	 to	 a	 conception	of	 empathy	 as	 experience,	 and	
more	specifically	as	an	intuitive	givenness	of	foreign	subjectivity.
1. Empathy as a mode of experience
Towards	the	end	of	Satyajit	Ray’s	film	Pather Panchali,	a	poor	man	arrives	
home	after	several	months	away,	unaware	that	in	his	absence	his	young	daugh-
ter	has	died.	On	his	arrival,	the	man	encounters	and	cheerfully	greets	his	wife,	
who	at	first	seems	to	avoid	his	gaze,	until	he	shows	her	a	sari	which	he	in-
tends	to	give	as	a	gift	to	his	daughter.	His	wife	clutches	the	gift	to	her	chest	
and	begins	to	uncontrollably	cry.	Realizing	his	wife’s	grief,	the	man	tries,	in	
vain,	to	comfort	her.	But,	just	in	this	immersed	awareness	of	his	wife’s	sad-
ness,	in	feeling	her	trembling	movements,	hearing	her	desperate	screams,	and	
seeing	her	hand	clenched	around	 the	sari,	 the	 tragic	event	 invoked	by	his	
wife’s	misery	becomes	apparent	to	the	man.	Indeed,	that	he	now	realises	his	
daughter’s	death	is	clear	to	his	wife	and	to	their	nearby	son,	in	that	he	himself	
descends	into	cries	of	grief.
Husserl	and	Stein	would	call	 the	man’s	awareness	of	his	wife’s	sadness	an	
empathic	awareness.	Characteristic	of	such	awareness	is	a	certain	form	of	di-
rectedness	towards	another	subject.	Empathic	awareness	is	thus	to	be	consid-
ered	as	an	intentional	awareness,	and	broadly	speaking	it	has	as	its	intentional	
object	either	the	other	herself,	or	something	belonging	to	her	experiential	life.	
But	which	particular	acts	are	we	then	to	pick	out,	from	such	concretely	inter-
subjective	encounters	as	lived	through	by	us,	and	identify	as	acts	of	empathy?	
In	this	paper,	I	will	work	with	the	contention	that	empathy,	at	least	in	its	most	
pregnant	and	precise	sense,	does	not	refer	to	the	man’s	attempts	to	comfort	
his	wife,	nor	to	his	own	feeling	of	grief	upon	learning	of	his	daughter’s	death,	
and,	likewise,	neither	to	whatever	sense	of	unity	he	may	experience	with	his	
wife	when	he	himself	becomes	overwhelmed	by	sadness.
Rather,	here	I	will	follow	Husserl	and	Stein	and	suggest	that	these	more	com-
plex	occurrences	may	only	be	clarified	once	we	attend	to	something	which	
they	each	 in	some	sense	presuppose.	More	specifically,	what	counts	 in	 the	
strict	sense	as	empathy	are	those	experiential	acts	in	which	a	foreign	subject	
is	not	merely	hypothesized	or	inferred,	but	rather	given	and	experienced	her-
self.	To	return	to	our	example,	it	is	simply	not	the	case	that	the	man	first	sees	
a	merely	physical	body	which	he	then	takes	as	indicative	of	his	wife,	rather	
he	has	an	irreducible	experience	of	the	woman	herself,	an	experience	which	
moreover	makes	all	else	which	occurs	in	the	encounter	possible.
A	 question	 arises	 here	 concerning,	 in	Husserlian	 terms,	whether	 empathic	
experience	 is	 intuitive	 in	 character.	 I	 cannot	 here	 fully	 spell	 out	 the	 com-
plex	notion	of	intuitive	experience,	but	one	should	note,	first,	that	only	those	
intentional	acts	which	present	their	object,	as	opposed	to	re-presenting	it	in	
some	manner,	are	intuitive	experiences,	and	in	this	sense	intuitive	experience	
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involves	a	certain	form	of	direct	or	presentational	consciousness	of	its	object.	
According	to	Husserl,	for	each	basic	class	of	intentional	object	(e.g.,	physical	
thing	or	mathematical	equation),	there	corresponds	a	type	of	intentional	act	
(e.g.,	perceptual	or	categorical)	in	which	such	an	object	is	given	intuitively.	
And	such	intuitive	givenness	is	accomplished	when	the	thing	actually	presents	
itself	to	us	as	bodily	present	(leibhaftig),	as	opposed	to	its	being	intended	in	a	
more	indirect	fashion	via	images,	signs	or	representations	(Husserl	1976:	11,	
14–15	[2014:	9,	13]).
Noteworthy	also	is	the	epistemic	role	played	by	intuitive	experience,	or	its	ev-
idential	character.	While	an	act	with	only	propositional	or	imaginary	content	
is	intentional,	in	the	sense	of	being	directed	towards	and	picking	out	an	object	
or	state	of	affairs,	whether	it	counts	as	a	form	of	knowledge	with	respect	to	the	
latter	is	not	an	intrinsic	feature	of	the	act.	Rather,	to	achieve	epistemic	contact	
with	 the	world,	 judgements	must	 stand	 in	 certain	 justificatory	 relations	 to	
other	acts.	According	to	Husserl,	one	way	in	which	a	judgement	can	gain	a	
prima facie justificatory	basis	is	for	the	object	or	state	of	affairs	that	it	picks	
out	to	be	directly	given	in	intuitive	experience	(Husserl	1976:	51	[2014:	44]).	
In	this	regard,	the	exemplary	case	of	intuitive	experience	is	perception.	While	
I	can	merely	entertain	the	thought	of	say,	my	bicycle	being	stolen,	and	while	
I	can	imagine	it	being	taken	from	the	spot	outside	where	I	left	it	this	morning,	
my	(“empty”)	intention	towards	this	state	of	affairs	gains	a	rather	strong	epis-
temic	basis	(becomes	“fulfilled”)	if	I	look	out	the	window	and	actually	see	a	
stranger	cycling	off	with	it.2
Now,	for	Husserl,	the	term	‘empathy’	denotes	a	specific	class	of	basic	inten-
tional	experiences:	“The	intentionality	 in	one’s	own	ego	that	 leads	 into	 the	
foreign	ego	is	the	so-called	empathy”	(Husserl	1962:	321).	Similarly,	as	Stein	
puts	it	in	Zum Problem der Einfühlung,	as	an	irreducible	intentional	awareness	
of	other	subjects’	lived	experiences	(Erlebnisse),	empathy	is	“a	kind	of	expe-
riential	act	sui generis”,	which	she	describes	as	the	experience	(Erfahrung)	of	
foreign	consciousness	in	general	(Stein	2008:	20	[1989:	11]).3	In	our	pre-the-
oretical	lives,	that	is,	other	people	appear	to	us	as	existing	realities	which,	in	a	
quite	peculiar	way,	differ in	their	givenness	from	oneself	and	from	the	merely	
physical.	And,	as	Stein	observes,	the	basic	form	of	awareness	one	has	of	other	
people	is	not	a	matter	of	recollection,	anticipation,	or	imagination,	and	nei-
ther	does	it	involve	mental	images,	inferences	or	communication	(Stein	2008:	
20	[1989:	11]).	Indeed,	our	thoughts	about	and	images	of	the	other’s	mental	
life	gain	whatever	validity	they	have	from	the	(admittedly	often	complex	and	
mediated)	ways	in	which	they	are	rooted	in	acts	of	empathy,	in	which	foreign	
experiencing	is	actually	encountered	(Stein	2008:	31	[1989:	19]).
Thus	empathy	seems	to	bear	many	of	the	hallmarks	of	intuitive	experience.	
And	yet	a	puzzle	presents	itself	here.	For	empathy,	considered	as	an	aware-
2
For	a	 recent	Husserlian	account	of	 the	epis-
temological	import	of	perception,	one	which	
engages	 in	 detail	 with	 contemporary	 philo-
sophical	 discussions	 of	 this	 issue,	 see	Hopp	
(2011).
3
When	referring	to	Stein,	I	have	used	the	criti-
cal	Gesamtausgabe	 edition	of	Zum Problem 
der Einfühlung.	Where	 possible	 I	 have	 pro-
vided	references	to	the	translation	by	Waltraut	
Stein	 in	 square	 brackets,	 although	 I	 have	 at	
times	departed	from	her	 terminologically.	 In	
particular,	I	have	rendered	‘Erlebnis’	as	‘lived	
experience’,	 ‘Erfahrung’	 as	 ‘experience’,	
‘Originär’	as	 ‘originary’,	and	‘Vergegenwär-
tigung’	 as	 ‘presentification’.	When	 referring	
to	Husserl	on	 the	other	hand,	 I	have	 simply	
referred	to	the	pagination	of	the	critical	Hus-
serliana	series,	since	the	English	translations	
of	 these	 texts	 (where	available)	also	contain	
marginal	references	to	the	latter,	with	the	ex-
ception	of	the	translation	of	Ideen I.
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ness	of	subjective	experience,	clearly	 lacks	 the	 intimacy	of	self-awareness.	
After	all,	one’s	lived	experiences	are,	irrespective	of	whether	they	are	given	to	
another	subject	in	empathy,	manifest	to	oneself	in	a	distinctive	and	immediate	
way.4	And	if	this	immediacy	were	characteristic	of	empathy	then	it	would	not	
be	an	experience	of	the	other	since,	as	Husserl	remarks,	the	other	himself	and	
I	myself	would	then	be	the	same	(Husserl	1950:	139).	Or	in	Stein’s	formula-
tion,	while	an	empathetic	experience	is	self-given	in	an	originary	(i.e.	direct	
and	 immediate)	 fashion,	 the	other’s	experiences	as	 the	content	of	empathy	
are	 not	 given	 in	 such	 an	 originary	 fashion	 (Stein	 2008:	 19	 [1989:	 10];	 cf.	
Husserl	1976:	11	[2014:	10]).	But	this	insight	can	be	reformulated	in	more	
positive	terms.	Consider	the	father	returning	home	in	Pather Panchali:	prior	
to	his	own	experience	of	misery	upon	comprehending	 the	 situation	he	has	
uncovered,	and	indeed	presumably	continuing	to	exist,	although	undoubtedly	
as	transformed,	during	his	misery,	is	a	numerically	and	qualitatively	distinct	
awareness	of	his	wife’s	misery.	One’s	own	misery	is	brought	to	givenness	in	
a	radically	different	manner	to	the	other’s	misery	–	but	essentially	so,	since	
this	difference	is	what	permits	my	own	misery	to	present	itself	as	genuinely	
mine,	and	the	other’s	misery	as	genuinely	other	(Stein	2008:	54	[1989:	38]).	
It	follows	that	empathy	is	both	an	irreducible,	direct	and	intuitive	experience	
of	other	subjects,	yet	one	essentially	characterized	by	its	distinction	from	the	
basic	intimacy	of	the	self	to	itself.
I	will	try	to	show	in	the	following	that	such	formulations	lose	much	of	their	
paradoxical	taste	when	one	considers	more	closely	Husserl	and	Stein’s	posi-
tive	 account	 of	 empathy.	 But	 first,	 it	 should	 be	 emphasized	 that	 this	 con-
ception	of	empathy	differs	significantly	from	that	offered	by	contemporary	
“simulationist”	theorists.5	Consider	de	Vignemont	and	Jacob,	who	appear	to	
resonate	with	the	account	presented	above	when	they	describe	empathy	as	an	
“other-directed”	experience	of	another	subject’s	affective	state	(de	Vignemont	
and	Jacob	2012:	304).	But	in	describing	empathy	as	an	experience	they	mean	
that	it	requires	the	empathizing	subject	to	imaginatively	enact	and	first-per-
sonally	“feel”	an	affective	state,	so	as	to	understand	the	mind	of	the	other	(de	
Vignemont	and	Jacob	2012:	297;	de	Vignemont	2010:	290).	And	when	they	
emphasize	the	other-directedness	of	empathy	they	mean	that	the	empathizer	
recognizes	that	her	first-personal	affective	state	is	both	caused	by	and	similar	
to	an	affective	state	first-personally	experienced	by	the	“target”	subject	(de	
Vignemont	and	Jacob	2012:	305).	For	Husserl	and	Stein,	on	the	other	hand,	
empathy	should	precisely	be	understood	as	an	intentional	act	which	immedi-
ately	grasps	 the	other	embodied	mind,	 irrespective	of	whether	 the	compre-
hended	experiences	are	currently	first-personally	lived	through	by	the	empa-
thizing	subject,	imaginatively	or	otherwise.	And	in	this	sense	they	endorse	a	
notion	of	empathic	experience	as	not	only	mediately	or	projectively	other-di-
rected.	Unlike	those	theorists	who	assume	that	the	minds	of	other	people	are	
ultimately	unexperienceable	domains	that	can	be	posited	only	through	imagi-
nation	or	inference,	the	account	offered	by	Stein	and	Husserl	has	the	strength	
of	 being	 attentive	 to	 the	 subtle	 and	unique	manner	 in	which	our	 everyday	
familiarity	with	others	arises	and	is	grounded	in	experiential	life.
2. Empathic perception and expressivity
In	illuminating	certain	salient	aspects	of	this	account,	I	will	begin	by	focussing	
on	 a	 claim	which	one	 finds	 fairly	 frequently	 in	Husserl’s	work,	 and	occa-
sionally	in	Stein’s,	namely	that	in	at	least	a	certain	mode	of	accomplishment	
empathy	must	be	understood	as	perceptual.6	Perception	should	here	be	under-
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stood	as	an	intuitive	experience	of	a	transcendent	object	in	one’s	surround-
ing	world	that	is	experientially	grasped	as	such,	although	as	we	shall	see	a	
peculiarity	in	the	case	of	empathy	is	that	the	other’s	body	is	perceived	as	an	
expressive	foreign	subject,	and	thus	as	not	simply	an	entity	“in”	the	world.	
Before	considering	this	line	of	thought	more	closely,	it	should	be	noted	that	
on	the	Husserlian	account,	perception	involves	two	interrelated	forms	of	pres-
ence,	which	must	both	necessarily	be	operative,	and	he	names	these	primal	
presence	(Urpräsenz)	and	appresence	(Appräsenz).	To	take	an	example,	I	may	
only	perceive	a	house	as	something	there	before	me	in	its	bodily	presence	if	
a	certain	 limited	set	of	 the	house’s	spatial	aspects	are	currently	sensuously	
present	to	me,	say	the	side	of	it	which	faces	the	street	and	the	interior	of	cer-
tain	rooms	whose	outer	windows	I	peer	through.	The	object	present,	however,	
is	only	a	transcendent	object	in	as	much	as	its	sensuously	appearing	aspects	
are	accompanied	by	profiles	which	are	not	currently	sensuously	present,	but	
which	are	rather	presentified	or	appresented	(Husserl	1950:	150–151;	1952,	
§44).7	That	is,	what	is	genuinely	given	sensuously	as	currently	oriented	to-
wards	my	body	only	appears	perceptually,	is	only	experienced	as	the	exterior	
of	a	house	I	am	walking	past,	in	virtue	of	a	co-given	horizon	of	other	aspects	
which	do	not	 currently	 appear	 sensuously,	 but	which	 are	 taken	 in	 the	per-
ceptual	act	itself	as possible	sensuous	presences	for	someone.	These	aspects,	
which	are	sensuously	absent	but	nevertheless	co-intended	as	aspects	of	 the	
object	bodily	present,	do	not	only	enable	the	transcendence	of	the	perceived	
object,	but	also	play	an	essential	role	in	determining	what	the	perceived	object	
is	experienced	as:	“from	the	very	beginning,	what this experience presents 
must belong to the unity of the very object appresented.”	(Husserl	1950:	151)	
Thus	for	Husserl,	both	primal	or	sensuous	presence	and	appresence	are	fun-
damental	components	of	all	perception,	and	the	same	structure	applies	in	the	
case	of	empathy.
4
For	detailed	elucidations	of	this	self-manifes-
tation	 or	 pre-reflective	 self-awareness,	 and	
arguments	to	the	effect	that	it	should	inform	
philosophical	 discussions	 of	 selfhood	 and	
consciousness,	see	Zahavi	(1999,	2014b).
5
Zahavi	(2014b)	has	recently	argued	in	detail	
for	the	contemporary	significance	of	the	posi-
tive	accounts	of	empathy	offered	by	phenom-
enologists	such	as	Husserl,	Stein,	Scheler,	and	
Schutz,	offering	a	detailed	critical	analysis	of	
the	 discussion	 between	 theory-theorists	 and	
simulationists.	There	has	been	 something	of	
an	upsurge	of	work	on	the	phenomenology	of	
empathy	in	recent	years,	much	of	it	engaging	
with	the	social	cognition	debate.	Along	with	
the	articles	referred	to	elsewhere	here,	see	e.g.	
Thompson	(2001),	De	Preester	(2008),	Smith	
(2010),	Zahavi	(2010),	Zahavi	and	Overgaard	
(2012),	 Overgaard	 (2012),	 Ratcliffe	 (2012),	
Gallagher	 (2012),	 Ingerslev	 (2014),	 Walsh	
(2014),	and	Taipale	(Forthcoming).
6
See	e.g.	Husserl	1973c:	514,	641;	1973b:	352;	
1950:	 150–151;	 and	 Stein	 2008:	 15,	 19–20,	
31,	75,	78	[1989:	58,	61].
7
Presentification	 (Vergegenwärtigung)	 should	
not	be	taken	as	strictly	identical	to	appresenta-
tion.	Husserl	uses	the	former	term	to	denote	a	
distinct	act	which	intuitively	gives	something	
not	perceptually	present	–	thus	memory	pre-
sentifies	the	past,	imagination	the	imaginary,	
etc	–	and	as	such	is	to	be	distinguished	from	
the	 co-givenness	 of	 the	 absent	 profiles	 of	
an	object,	which	 is	non-intuitive	 and	occurs	
only	as	a	partial	intention	within	a	presenta-
tive	act	 (Husserl	1966:	4,	68–69).	However,	
when	describing	empathy	Husserl	also	char-
acterizes	appresentation	as	“a	presentification	
combined	by	association	with	presentation	…	
in	the	particular	function	of	‘co-perception’”.	
(Husserl	 1950:	 150)	This	may	 be	 due	 a	 pe-
culiar	feature	of	empathic	perception,	namely	
that	here	the	presentification	of	the	other’s	ex-
periences	functions	in	an	appresentative	way,	
since	it	is	constantly	intertwined	with	the	sen-
sory	givenness	of	his	or	her	body,	 in	such	a	
manner	that	both	are	given	as	actually	present	
aspects	of	a	perceived	unity.
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A	phenomenological	elucidation	of	the	notion	of	empathy	as	a	form	of	per-
ception	can	be	found	in	Husserl’s	analyses	of	the	personalistic	attitude	in	the	
second	book	of	Ideen,	and	it	will	first	be	necessary	to	briefly	spell	out	what	
this	attitude	amounts	to.	As	Husserl	argues	in	Sections	1	and	2	of	Ideen II,	the	
naturalistic	attitude,	which	 is	 the	orientation	 towards	 the	world	adopted	by	
the	natural	scientist	in	his	or	her	research	activities,	is	guided	by	the	underly-
ing	motive	of	determining	the	‘objective’,	substantial	properties	of	physical	
or	psychophysical	entities,	those	which	are	manifest	in	the	altering	states	of	
physical	things	and	creatures	in	their	relation	to	causal	circumstances.8	But	
this	motive	can	be	realized	only	after	a	certain	abstraction	is	accomplished,	
in	which	the	axiological,	practical,	and	aesthetic	predicates	which	are,	in	or-
dinary	life,	immediately	experienced	as	belonging	to	worldly	objects	are	dis-
regarded,	or	as	Husserl	also	puts	it,	in	which	certain	intentionalities	belong-
ing	to	the	personal	sphere	are	temporarily	“neutralized”	and	the	relativity	of	
perceptual	objects	to	the	bodily	peculiarities	of	their	perceiver	overcome,	so	
that	the	‘Objectively	real’	can	be	come	into	view	as	something	to	be	studied	
through	mathematical	 natural	 science	 (Husserl	 1952:	 8–10,	 27,	 76,	 84–90,	
186–8).	The	personalistic	attitude,	on	the	other	hand,	is	just	the	prior	attitude	
of	 everyday	 life,	 in	which	 subjects	 do	not	 adopt	 an	 abstractive	 orientation	
towards	 the	 objects	 of	 their	 surrounding	world	 (Umwelt),	 but	 rather	 expe-
rience	 them	 in	 their	 life-worldly	 concreteness,	 a	 concreteness	which	 refers	
in	its	sense	to	one’s	own	and	others’	personal	evaluations,	motivations,	and	
past	experiences	(Husserl	1952:	§§50–51).	Husserl	thus	maintains	that	“the	
naturalistic	attitude	is	subordinated	to	the	personalistic”,	and	that	the	natural	
scientist	may	only	take	his	or	her	theoretical	activity	to	bear	an	exhaustive,	
absolute	and	unconditioned	cognitive	 relation	 to	 the	world	by	means	of	“a	
kind	of	 self-forgetfulness	of	 the	personal	Ego”,	only	 if	 the	abstraction	 just	
described	has	 become	 a	matter	 of	 habit	 (Husserl	 1952:	 183–184).	He	 also	
insists	that	it	is	for	subjects	of	the	personalistic	as	opposed	to	the	naturalistic	
attitude	that	sociality	operates,	and	in	which	culture	and	society	can	blossom,	
since	it	is	in	this	attitude	that	others	are	encountered	as	persons	and	engaged	
with	communicatively	(Husserl	1952:	§51).
The	manner	of	givenness	of	other people	for	subjects	in	the	personalistic	at-
titude,	then,	provides	an	appropriate	basis	from	which	a	phenomenology	of	
empathy	may	at	 least	gain	an	 initial	 footing.	And	for	Husserl,	 the	personal	
subject	 “sees”	 in	 its	 surrounding	 world	 other	 personal	 subjects,	 “persons	
who	are	engaged	in	their	own	surrounding	world”	(Husserl	1952:	190).	More	
precisely,	other	persons	are	not	comprehended	through	the	seeing	of	things,	
rather	what	is	first	and	foremost	seen	of	the	other	person	is	the	person	herself,	
as	 “intrinsically	 one”	 (Husserl	 1952:	 320).	According	 to	Husserl,	we	may	
only	take	other	persons	as	mere	things	through	a	naturalistic	apprehension,	in	
which	their	lived	body	(Leib)	is	abstracted	from	this	unity	and	regarded	as	a	
material	thing	like	any	other,	a	step	which	forces	naturalistic	psychology	to	
posit	a	further	natural	strata	in	the	form	of	a	psyche	(Seele)	bound	to	and	de-
pendent	upon	the	material	body	–	a	double	movement	which,	while	legitimate	
for	certain	theoretical	purposes,	certainly	does	not	lead	to	the	person	as	such	
(Husserl	1952:	139–140,	190–191).	On	the	other	hand,	Husserl	characterizes	
the	other	person	as	given	in	the	personalistic	attitude	as	a	unity	in	which	a	
lived	body	is	given	as	immediately	expressive	of	mental	(geistig)	–	that	is,	
personal-subjective	–	attributes	or	experiences,	and	he	maintains	that	this	pe-
culiar,	yet	“thoroughly	intuitive”	unity	is	experienced	most	fully	and	themati-
cally	in	acts	of	empathy	(Husserl	1952:	236,	244).
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Husserl	more	precisely	characterizes	the	phenomenological	structure	of	such	
experience	in	the	following	passage:
“In	a	certain	way,	I	also	experience	(and	 there	 is	a	self-givenness	here)	 the	other’s	 lived	ex-
periences	;	to	the	extent	that	empathy	(comprehensio)	accomplished	as	one	with	the	originary	
experience	of	the	lived	body	is	indeed	a	kind	of	presentification	[Vergegenwärtigung],	one	that	
nevertheless	serves	to	ground	the	character	of	co-existence	in	the	flesh.	To	that	extent,	what	we	
have	here	is	thus	experience,	perception.	But	this	co-existence	(“appresence”	…)	does	not,	in	
principle,	allow	itself	 to	be	 transformed	into	 immediate	originary	existence	(primal	presence	
[Urpräsenz]).”	(Husserl	1952:	198)
Husserl	indicates	here	that	the	experience	of	the	other	person	simultaneously	
involves	a	 two-fold	appresence.	Given	 in	appresence	here	are	both	aspects	
of	what	is	physical	(namely	the	absent	“sides”	of	the	other’s	body)	and	non-
physical	 aspects	 (namely	 the	 other’s	 lived	 experiences).	 It	 is	 only	 through	
being	 co-intended	with	 both	 such	 sorts	 of	 appresented	 aspects	 that	 the	 as-
pect	of	the	other	which	is	sensuously	given,	appears	as	aspect	of	the	other.	
Noteworthy	here	is	that	while	the	other’s	appresented	physical	aspects	may	
come	to	primal	or	sensuous	presence	through	a	movement	on	behalf	of	either	
the	empathizing	or	the	empathized	subject,	the	experiential	life	of	the	other	
necessarily	remains	in	appresence.	On	Husserl’s	view,	the	lived	experiences	
of	the	other	may	only	be	empathically	experienced	in	such	a	way	that	they	
remain	–	in	a	certain	sense	–	continually	absent,	as	this	is	what	grounds	the	
other’s	phenomenological	character	as	co-existing,	as	a	subject	with	his	or	her	
own	lived	experiences.
It	is	this	double	appresence	of	empathy	which	makes	it	an	experience	of	an	
expressive	whole,	and	 to	grasp	 the	character	of	empathic	perception	 it	will	
be	important	to	dwell	on	this	notion	of	the	object	of	empathy	as	something	
expressive.	Husserl	means	by	this,	first,	that	the	other’s	spatiotemporal	being	
is	only	experienced	as	such	insofar	as	it	immediately	manifests	the	existence	
of	foreign	lived	experience,	and	likewise	that	the	other’s	subjectivity	is	only	
directly	experienced	in	its	embodiment.	While	it	is	the	other’s	bodily	presence	
which	affords	the	possibility	of	his	or	her	being	concretely	experienced,	this	
bodily	presence	is	always	already	an	embodied-subjective	one,	or	as	Husserl	
expresses	 the	point,	 the	other	human	being	which	 I	 see	before	me,	“in	his	
movements,	in	his	action,	in	his	speaking	and	writing,	etc.,	is	not	a	mere	con-
nection	or	linking	up	of	one	thing,	called	a	soul,	with	another	thing,	a	lived	
body.	The	lived	body	is,	as	lived	body,	filled	with	soul	through	and	through.”	
(Husserl	1952:	240)
Moreover,	in	empathy	one	does	not	intend	an	aggregate	of	lived	experiences,	
nor	a	unified	physical	body,	but	rather	the	object	is	precisely	a	person:	“In	em-
pathy	we	apprehend	persons”	(Husserl	1952,	320).	And	this	person	appears	as	
a	unity	which	“has	corporeality	[Leiblichkeit],	it	has	a	body	which	is	a	physi-
cal	thing	with	such	and	such	qualities,	and	it	has	lived	experiences	and	lived	
dispositions”	(Husserl	1952:	240).	Husserl’s	point,	then,	is	not	merely	that	the	
other	of	empathy	is	a	special	sort	of	expressive	object	with	both	mental	and	
8
See	e.g.	Husserl	(1952:	§11,	§15–17,	§32).	In-
cidentally,	Stein	herself	played	a	significance	
role	 in	 the	formation	of	what	we	now	know	
as	 Ideen II,	 since	 she	 elaborated	 and	 edited	
the	manuscripts	which	ultimately	found	their	
way	into	this	posthumously	published	work,	
and	 it	 is	 undoubtedly	 the	 case	 that	 some	 of	
the	passages	in	this	text	are	just	as	much	her	
own	work	as	they	are	Husserl’s.	The	true	ex-
tent	of	this	will	become	much	clearer	with	the	
publication	 of	 the	 original	 manuscripts	 that	
Husserl	intended	for	use	in	Ideen II and	III	in	
a	Husserliana	volume,	edited	by	Dirk	Fonfara	
and	Dieter	Lohmar,	that	is	expected	to	appear	
in	2015.
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material	strata,	but	rather	that	those	aspects,	as	they	are	given	to	the	subject	
empathizing,	manifest	the	unity	and	transcendence	of	another	personal	life.	
The	other	experiential	life	which	exists	for	the	empathizing	subject	as,	and	
“in”,	this	expressive	unity,	also	exists	in	and	for	itself	in	a	manner	which	dif-
fers	from	its	existence-for-me,	and	Husserl	thus	writes	that	other’s	own	self-
presence	is	referred	to,	but	not	originally accomplished,	in	the	act	of	empathy	
(Husserl	 1952:	 198).	But	 empathy	 is	 nevertheless	 a	 “thoroughly	 intuitive”	
experience	of	another	person,	one	which	frequently	incorporates	not	only	a	
recognition	of	the	bare	presence	of	another	experiential	life,	but	also	an	im-
mediate	grasp	of	the	type	of	experiential	episode	the	other	is	undergoing,	and	
in	this	respect	something	of	the	other’s	personality	may	even	announce	itself	
(Husserl	1952:	235,	273–274).
Finally,	that	the	other	of	empathy	is	given	as	expressive	means	that	an	expres-
sive relation	pertains	between	the	other’s	body	and	the	personal	life	experi-
enced	“therein”.	But	one	should	avoid	the	temptation	to	understand	this	as	the	
idea	that,	while	 the	other’s	body	is	a	perceived	physical	reality,	her	mental	
life	is	something	merely	intended	signitively,	as	if	her	body	were	a	sign	for	
a	distinct	and	absent	object	–	rather,	Husserl	insists	that	what	is	experienced	
in	empathy	is	 the	“unity	of	 the	‘expression’	and	the	‘expressed’”,	 the	other	
person	herself	 (Husserl	1952:	236).	While	Husserl	 in	 Ideen II	 does	 indeed	
speak	of	the	other’s	mind	(Geist)	as	the	sense	of	the	lived-body,	and	claims	
that	empathy	is	the	apprehension	of	the	lived	body	which	grasps	this	sense,	he	
means	by	this	that	empathy	is	an	apprehension	which	discloses	that	body	as	
what	it	concretely	is	(i.e.,	as	the	embodiment	of	a	person),	and	he	stresses	that	
this	occurs	in	a	single	stroke,	and	does	not	permit	of	temporal	differentiation	
(Husserl	1952:	240–241,	244).	The	other’s	facial	expressions,	for	example,	
“are	seen	facial	expressions,	and	they	are	 immediately	bearers	of	sense	for	
the	other’s	consciousness,	e.g.,	his	will,	which,	in	empathy,	is	characterized	
as	the	actual	will	of	this	person	and	as	a	will	which	addresses	me	in	commu-
nication”	(Husserl	1952:	235).	In	this	vein,	Husserl	notes	that	the	empathy	in	
which	such	immediate	expressivity	 is	 laid	bare	involves	the	other’s	merely	
bodily	appearances	being	articulated	 in	 such	a	manner	 that	 they	constitute	
“a	certain	corporeality	[Leibliches]	with	a	certain	mentality	[Geistigen]	–	a	
certain	one,	which,	as	horizon	of	experience,	is	to	be	determined	further	by	
experience.”	(Husserl	1952:	242)	Husserl	indicates	here	that	there	is	a	single	
apprehension	which,	 in	grasping	 its	 sense	 as	 an	 embodied	mind,	gives	 the	
body	both	its	particular	sense	as	this	lived-body	and	as this	personal	subject,	
and	moreover,	that	this	“horizonal”	givenness	of	the	other	person	is	open	to	
further	determination,	is	continually	modifying	and	enriching	itself.	In	short,	
in	 personalistic	 empathy	 the	 ‘merely	 physical’	 is	 at	 no	 stage	 given,	 rather	
what	presents	itself	is	a	whole,	the	person,	with	two	intertwined	dimensions,	
the	lived	body	as	essentially	personally	significant,	and	the	personal	subject	
as	essentially	manifesting	 itself	 in	 the	 lived	body.	Expressivity	 then	means	
that	the	person	is	a	unity	of	two	dimensions	–	bodily	“expression”	of	mind,	
mind	“expressed”	bodily	–	each	of	which	gain	their	particular	sense	in	rela-
tion	to	the	other	(Husserl	1952:	325).9
To	summarize,	Husserl’s	analysis	of	 the	personalistic	attitude	suggests	 that	
one	 can	 speak	of	 at	 least	 a	 certain	 type	of	 empathy	 as	perceptual,	 so	 long	
as	one	respects	several	crucial	nuances.	First,	what	is	perceived	in	empathy	
is	not	a	 spatiotemporal	 thing,	but	 rather	another	person.	Second,	while	 the	
phenomenological	 structures	of	 empathy	and	 the	perception	of	 things	both	
involve	a	highly	structured	interplay	of	spatiotemporal	aspects	dynamically	
coming	to	presence	and	appresence,	empathic	intentionality	also	involves	the	
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appresence	of	the	other’s	mental	life.	Or	rather,	in	empathy	the	other’s	body	
is	given	as	immediately	expressive,	that	is,	as	constituting	a	mentally	infused	
bodily	dimension,	this	dimension	being	intertwined,	in	personal	unity,	with	
a	subjective	 life	manifesting	itself	bodily.	Third,	and	in	 light	of	 this	bodily	
‘articulated’	subjective	dimension	of	the	other	person,	the	object	of	empathy	
has	a	more	profound	transcendence	than	does	the	perceived	spatiotemporal	
object,	since	the	other’s	experiential	life	is	grasped	in	the	act	of	empathy	as	
given	to	itself	in	a	way	which	differs	radically	from	its	empathic	givenness.
3. Empathic explication and foreign intentionality
There	is,	however,	a	certain	danger	in	understanding	empathy	in	terms	of	per-
ception,	since	one	may	then	end	up	overlooking	a	crucial	aspect	of	empathy.	
In	the	scene	from	Pather Panchali	introduced	earlier,	the	man	is	aware	of	his	
wife	as	a	world-directed	subject	of	intentional	acts.	Only	if	it	includes	this	lat-
ter	awareness	does	empathy	play	a	role	in	the	man’s	realization	that	his	wife	
is,	in	her	sadness,	aware	of	the	all	too	worldly	event	of	their	daughter’s	death.	
It	is	unclear,	perhaps,	just	how	this	realization	is	reached	–	perhaps	a	process	
of	 deliberation	 or	 imagination,	 or	 through	 a	 comprehension	 of	 the	 signifi-
cance	which	the	sari	he	gives	to	his	wife	has	for	her,	play	an	important	role.	
But	in	any	case	the	realization	has	as	its	basis	an	experience	the	man	has	of	his	
wife	in	which	her	own	experiential	world-directedness	is	explicated,	and	in	a	
manner	continuous	with	his	perception	of	her.	His	empathic	grasp,	then,	does	
not	solely	consist	in	a	comprehension	of	something	“about	the	other”,	but	cru-
cially	involves	a	comprehension	of	the	other’s	self-transcending	experiences.	
Empathy	is	then	able	to	achieve	a	grasp	of	the	other’s	experiential	life	which	
uncovers	aspects	of	the	content,	structure,	and	objects	of	that	life.	If	it	were	
not	the	case	that	these	aspects	could	be	empathically	comprehended,	that	is,	
if	the	other’s	intentional	experiences	could	not	be	manifested	in	their	specifi-
city,	then	the	other	would	at	best	be	indeterminately	taken	as	a	subject,	and	at	
worst,	as	a	reified	psychophysical	“thing”	of	the	natural	or	cultural	world.
In	her	attempt	to	clarify	this	aspect	of	empathy,	Stein	helpfully	distinguishes	
between	empathy	as	perceptual	experience	of	the	other	person,	in	which	the	
other	 is	 the	 intentional	object,	 and	what	 she	 takes	 to	different	 level	of	 em-
pathic	accomplishment	 (Vollzugsstufe).10	As	Stein	notes,	while	 in	 the	 initial	
apprehension	of	the	other’s	sadness	“in”	her	face,	that	sadness	faces	me	as	an	
object,
9
Michael	Theunissen	has	argued	 that,	despite	
occasionally	stressing	the	immediacy	of	per-
sonalistic	alien	experience,	 the	mode	of	em-
pathy	 which	 Husserl	 takes	 to	 underlie	 such	
experience	 is	mediate	 and	 reifying,	 and	 that	
his	 account	 is	 therefore	 ultimately	 unable	
to	 do	 justice	 to	 the	 direct	 character	 of	 life-
worldly	 alien	 encounters	 (Theunissen	 1965:	
§§21–22).	 It	 seems	 to	 me,	 however,	 that	
Theunissen’s	 presentation	 of	 Ausdrucksver-
stehen	 fails	 to	do	 justice	 to	Husserl’s	 insist-
ence	 that	 personalistic	 empathy	 is	 first	 and	
foremost	an	intuitive	experience	of	the	other	
as	 unitary	 embodied	Geist,	 and	 that	 the	 ex-
pressive	 relation	 is	 located	within	 this	origi-
nary	unity.	The	passages	referred	to	above	ap-
pear	to	adduce	greater	textual	support	to	this	
reading	than	Theunissen’s	own,	of	which	the	
following	formulation	is	typical:	“Der	fremde	
Leibkörper	ist	ja	sozusagen	das	vorgegebene	
Material,	das	ich	auf	seine	geistige	Bedeutung	
hin	 interpretiere.”	 (Theunissen	 1965:	 120)	
On	 the	 issue	 of	 expressivity	 in	Husserl,	 see	
Heinämaa	(2011).
10
Stein’s	descriptions	of	this	level	or	modality	
of	 empathy	 are	 highly	 suggestive	 but	 could	
probably	benefit	with	more	precision.	Unsur-
prisingly,	one	finds	a	variety	of	interpretations	
in	the	secondary	literature.	Cf.	Zahavi	(2014:	
137–138);	Shum	(2012:	185–195);	Dullstein,	
(2013:	343–346).
SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA	
58	(2/2014)	pp.	(273–288)
J.	Jardine,	Husserl	and	Stein	on	the	Pheno-
menology	of	Empathy282
“when	I	inquire	into	its	implied	tendencies	(try	to	bring	another’s	mood	to	clear	givenness	to	
myself),	the	content,	having	pulled	me	into	it,	is	no	longer	really	an	object.	I	am	now	no	longer	
turned	to	the	content	but	to	the	object	of	it,	am	at	the	subject	of	the	content	in	the	original	sub-
ject’s	place.	And	only	after	successively	executed	clarification,	does	the	content	again	face	me	
as	an	object.”	(Stein	2008:	19	[1989:	10])
In	 Stein’s	 example,	 the	 perception	 of	 the	 other	 as	 undergoing	 a	 particular	
mood	already	contains	tendencies	towards	a	fulfilling	explication,	by	means	
of	which	 the	(other’s)	experiential	context	 in	which	 that	mood	is	 lived	can	
be	made	thematic	and	explicated,	in	such	a	manner	that	the	contents	of	the	
other’s	experiences	are	 incorporated	within	the	content	of	 the	act	of	empa-
thy	(Stein	2008:	20	[1989,	11]).	Stein	claims	that	such	empathic	explication	
constitutes	a	clarification	and	fulfilment	of	the	perceptual	phase,	and	this	im-
plies	that	in	optimal	cases	empathy	has	a	certain	teleological	structure,	that	
it	unfolds	towards	an	ideal	state	of	comprehension	in	which,	as	Stein	writes,	
the	empathized	joy	is	the	same	as	the	other’s	originally	lived	joy	“in	every	
respect”,	having	“the	same	content	and	only	a	different	mode	of	givenness.”	
(Stein	 2008:	 25	 [1989:	 15])	But	what	 precisely	 does	 empathic	 explication	
amount	 to,	 if	 it	 is	neither	exactly	empathic	perception	and	yet	does	not	 in-
volve	the	experience	being	given	as	if	it	were	one’s	own?
Stein	describes	explication	as	“the	non-original	parallel	to	the	having	of	the	
experience”,	 by	which	 she	means	 that	while	 the	 empathic	 act	 is,	 like	 any	
experience,	 one	 originally	 had,	 the	 empathized	 content,	while	 being	 given	
as	the	content	of	an	original	experience,	is	not	given	in	the	manner	in	which	
one	 one’s	 own	 experiences	 are	manifest	 as	 one	 lives	 through	 them,	 but	 is	
rather	given	as	the	content	of	an	experience	one	is	not	originally	accomplish-
ing.	Empathic	living-in	is	not	an	original	self-presentation,	but	rather	a	sort	
of	“presentification	of	lived	experiences”,	that	is,	a	bringing	to	givenness	of	
what	 is	originally	present	 in	experiences	which	 the	subject	 is	not	currently	
undergoing.	That	is,	this	stage	of	empathy	is	more	closely	analogous	to	imagi-
nation	or	memory	than	perception,	in	that	the	empathizing	subject	becomes	
momentarily	aware	of	an	experiential	context	 in	 its	 lived	concreteness,	but	
one	 that	 differs	 in	 certain	 essential	ways	 from	 her	 own	 current	 perceptual	
sphere.	However,	Stein	 emphasizes	 that	here	 too	empathy	 remains	distinct	
from	imagination	and	memory,	 targeting	a	different	domain	of	experiences	
(namely,	 those	of	 the	other,	not	a	past	or	 imagined	self),	and	having	a	dif-
ferent	 type	of	epistemic	 import	and	motivation	 (Stein	2008:	19–20,	 [1989:	
10–11]).	Empathic	explication	thus	gives	its	content	as	the	content	of	original	
experiences	being	had	by	another	subject	“here	and	now”,	but	not	by	the	em-
pathizing	subject.	And	the	content	brought	to	givenness	in	this	way	is	none	
other	than	that	emptily	intended	in	empathic	perception,	just	as	the	subject	for	
whom	this	content	is	originally	“had”	is	the	other	personal	subject	empathi-
cally	perceived.
Monika	Dullstein	(2013)	has	recently	argued	that,	in	light	of	her	characteriza-
tion	of	this	explicatory	stage	as	involving	a	non-original	bringing	to	givenness	
of	the	other’s	experiences,	Stein’s	analysis	gives	support	to	what	de	Vigne-
mont	and	Jacob	(2012)	call	in	their	own	account	the	isomorphism	condition	
of	empathy.	This	condition	states	that,	at	least	in	the	most	enhanced	and	ideal	
form	of	empathy,	both	the	empathizing	and	the	empathized	subject	must	share	
a	mental	state,	in	the	sense	of	the	empathizing	subject	having	a	representation	
of	 the	mental	state	empathized,	a	 representation	which	moreover	 is	similar	
in	 its	 content	 and	 intentional	 object	 to	 the	 actual	mental	 state	 represented	
(Dullstein	 2013:	 346–348).	 Dullstein	 correctly	 acknowledges	 that	 Stein’s	
description	of	empathic	explication	as	a	Vergegenwärtigung	–	a	term	which	
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Dullstein,	perhaps	misleadingly	in	this	context,	translates	as	‘representation’	
–	does	not	commit	her	to	the	idea	that	the	empathizing	subject	must	imagina-
tively	simulate	the	other’s	experience,	so	as	to	experience	it	in	a	first-personal	
or	primordial	manner,	a	position	which	de	Vignemont	and	Jacob	defend	 in	
their	own	account	(Dullstein	2013:	348).	But	if	correctly	understood,	it	seems	
to	me	that	this	insight	of	Stein’s	renders	inappropriate	any	talk	of	empathy	as	
involving	isomorphism,	and	indeed	‘representation’	in	Dullstein’s	sense.	For	
if	it	is	only	the	other’s	experience	that	is	presentified,	and	not	my	own,	then	
in	successful	cases	of	empathic	explication	the	experience	presentified	is	not	
merely	similar	to	the	other’s	actual	experience,	but	it	is	that	experience	itself,	
given	in	the	mode	of	empathy	as	opposed	to	that	of	self-awareness.	Indeed	for	
Stein	the	moment	one	presentifies	an	experience	which	one	posits	as	some-
thing	similar	to,	as	opposed	to	sharing	an	identity	with,	the	other’s	experience,	
we	now	no	longer	have	a	case	of	empathy.	Rather	such	a	case	would	involve	
an	act	of	imagination	whose	content	is	presumed	to	correspond	to	the	real-
ity	of	the	other’s	experience,	a	correspondence	which	could	only	be	directly	
confirmed	on	the	basis	of	a	genuine	act	of	empathy.11
For	Stein,	that	is,	the	only	one	who	actually	has	the	experience	which	I	em-
pathically	explicate	is	the	other	who	I	see	before	me.	Thus	in	such	explication	
the	content	I	grasp	is	original	content	for	the	other,	content	which	I	do	not	origi-
nally	live	through	myself,	or	put	differently,	while	in	empathic	perception	one	
apprehends	a	foreign	subject	as	embodied,	empathic	explication	thematises	
this	very	same	subject	in	the	nexus	of	her	world-directed	intentional	acts.	To	
be	more	precise,	the	other’s	intentionality	is	emptily	meant	in	empathic	per-
ception,	but	it	may	only	be	determinately	and	fulfillingly	uncovered	through	
a	positional	shift	on	behalf	of	the	empathizing	ego	in	which	the	‘I’	ceases	to	
intend	the	other	as	object	and	rather	allows	the	content	and	objects	of	the	oth-
er’s	own	intending	to	become	manifest.	As	Stein	notes,	the	peculiarity	of	this	
mode	of	empathy,	that	it	is	neither	intuitive	nor	representational,	should	not	
compel	the	phenomenologist	to	declare	it	unintelligible,	but	testifies	only	that	
“it	refuses	to	be	classified	in	one	of	the	pigeonholes	of	psychology”	(Stein	
2008:	33	[1989:	20]).	Moreover,	while	being	a	non-objectifying	experience,	it	
nevertheless	makes	possible	a	subsequent	positional	shift	in	which	the	experi-
ence	is	again	intended	as	object,	but	now	with	a	richer	(and,	we	might	add,	
potentially	transformed)	sense	(Stein	2008:	19–20	[1989:	10–11]).
Husserl,	on	 the	other	hand,	does	not	appear	 to	conceive	of	 the	relation	be-
tween	empathic	perception	and	empathic	explication	in	terms	of	a	temporal	
progression	from	the	former	to	the	latter.	Rather,	in	a	passage	already	quoted,	
Husserl	maintains	that	empathy	as	a	presentification	of	the	other’s	lived	ex-
perience	is unified	with	the	originary	presentation	of	the	lived	body,	and	he	
11
Stein	 maintains	 that,	 despite	 differing	 from	
thing-perception	 in	 its	making	 present	what	
may	not	be	strictly	bodily	given	(but	only	co-
given),	it	is	precisely	the	non-representational	
character	 and	 evidential	 import	 of	 empathy	
that	 makes	 it	 comparable	 to	 the	 outer	 per-
ception	 of	material	 objects	 (Stein	 2008:	 31,	
37–38	 [1989:	 19,	 24]).	Given	 this,	 it	 seems	
to	me	 that	when	Dullstein	 stipulates	 that,	 in	
occasionally	characterizing	empathy	as	a	per-
ception	Stein	merely	“tried	to	take	her	super-
visor’s	 views	 into	 account	 and	 to	point	 to	 a	
possible	way	of	combining	her	and	Husserl’s	
ideas”	(Dullstein	2013:	343),	she	underplays	
the	 structural	 similarities	 which	 Stein	 often	
stresses	 between	 thing-perception	 and	 em-
pathy.	Moreover,	it	is	also	worthwhile	noting	
that	when	Stein	distinguishes	 empathy	 from	
perception,	 she	 always	distinguishes	 it	 from	
the	 perception	 of	 material	 objects.	 Conse-
quently,	I	see	no	basis	for	supposing	that	Stein	
would	 reject	 the	Husserlian	 analysis	 of	 sec-
tion	3,	and	 its	conclusion	 that	empathy	may	
be	regarded	as	perceptual-intuitive	experience	
of	the	other	person,	understood	as	irreducible	
to	the	perception	of	material	objects.
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describes	the	experience	which	involves	both	apprehensions	as	a	perception	
(Husserl	 1952:	 198).	And	he	writes	 that	 in	 the	 “comprehensive experience 
of the existence of the other”	he	or	she	is	understood,	“without	further	ado,	
as	a	personal	subject	and	thereby	as	related	to	Objectivities”	(Husserl	1952:	
191).	Husserl’s	position	would	then	seem	to	be	that	empathic	perception	does	
not	merely	emptily	and	indeterminately	grasp	the	content	of	the	other’s	lived	
experiences,	so	as	to	require	a	fulfilling	explication,	but	rather	that	it	already	
has	those	lived	experiences	as	co-given	in	a	non-objectifying	manner,	that	it	
already	presentifies	them	in	their	own	directedness,	and	with	their	own	inten-
tional	contents	and	objects,	and	that	this	informs	the	sense	of	the	other	person	
as	perceived.12
Husserl	occasionally	goes	so	far	as	to	claim	that	empathy	is	a	non-experien-
tial	form	of	awareness,	a	claim	which	could	be	understood	as	the	suggestion	
that	 sensory	givenness	 is	 in	 fact	 inessential	 for	 empathy.	As	he	writes,	 the	
empathic	apprehension	of	the	other	as	personal	ego
“which	here	can	no	longer	be	considered	an	‘experiential	consciousness’	or	an	‘apperception,’	
still	does	not	involve	my	making	the	natural	reality	of	the	other	my	thematic	Object,	i.e.,	taking	
a	human	being	as	a	member	of	nature.	Rather	I	am,	in	empathy,	directed	to	the	other	Ego	and	
Ego-life	and	not	to	psychophysical	reality,	which	is	a	double	reality	with	physical	reality	at	the	
founding	level.	The	other’s	body	is	for	me	a	passageway	(in	‘expression,’	in	indication,	etc.,)	
towards	the	understanding	of	the	Ego	there,	the	‘he:’	he	moves	his	hand,	he	reaches	for	this	or	
that,	he	strikes,	he	considers,	he	is	motivated	by	this	or	that.	He	is	the	centre	of	a	surrounding	
world	appearing	to	him,	present	to	him	in	memory,	thought	about,	etc.,	and	included	in	it	is	a	
corporeal	surrounding	world,	which	to	a	great	extent	he	has	in	common	with	me	and	with	oth-
ers.”	(Husserl	1952:	347)
Husserl	seems	in	this	passage	to	identify	empathy	with	the	comprehension	of	
the	other’s	subjectivity	in	its	own	concrete	intentional	directedness,	to	such	
an	extent	that	such	empathic	comprehension	is	distinguished	from,	and	even	
gains	a	certain	priority	over,	the	sensory	experience	of	the	other’s	body.	How-
ever,	I	take	it	that	Husserl	should	not	be	understood	here	as	denying	that	em-
pathy	is	an	experiential	awareness	of	foreign	subjectivity.	Rather,	his	claim	is	
that	empathic	experience	has	as	an	essential	component	a	comprehension	of	
what	cannot	be	given	merely	sensuously,	namely,	the	other’s	subjective	life	
and	its	own	intentional	correlates.	Furthermore,	this	comprehension	is	so	fun-
damental	that	in	empathy	the	sensuously	given	is	immediately	encountered	
as	that which expresses	this	subjective	life.	Expressivity,	then,	is	for	Husserl	
essentially	connected	with	intentionality,	and	the	perception	of	the	personal	
subject	always	 involves	an	element	of	comprehension	of	 the	other’s	 inten-
tional	directedness.
It	 seems	 to	me	 that	on	 this	point	Husserl’s	and	Stein’s	 respective	accounts	
are	not	 in	 fact	mutually	exclusive.	With	Stein,	one	can	maintain	 that	 there	
are	many	cases	in	which	one’s	immediate	apprehension	of	the	other	involves	
a	 certain	 emptiness	 of	 content,	 which	 then	 becomes	 determinate	 and	 full	
through	 the	other’s	 intentional	 experiences	being	 explicated.	This	may	oc-
cur,	 for	 example,	when	one	 sees	 the	miserable	 face	 of	 a	 homeless	 person,	
which	(perhaps	due	to	the	intolerable	normality	of	such	encounters)	one	first	
apprehends	as	“the	face	of	a	beggar”,	and	then	only	subsequently	grasps	as	
embodying	a	presentified	desperation.	On	the	other	hand,	one	can	maintain	
with	Husserl	that	empathy	does	not	simply	take	the	other	as	intentional	object,	
that	from	the	beginning	the	empathizing	subject	faces	the	presence	of	foreign	
intentional	 experiencing,	 and	does	 so	with	 some	degree	of	 insight	 into	 the	
structure	and	contents	of	the	latter.13
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Conclusion
In	Section	2	I	described	empathy	in	terms	of	an	intuitive	givenness	of	foreign	
subjectivity,	and	it	may	now	be	considered	how	such	a	characterisation	bears	
upon	the	two	distinct	moments	of	empathy,	namely	perception	and	explica-
tion,	brought	to	light	in	Husserl’s	and	Stein’s	analyses.
Let	me	 first	 consider	whether	empathy	can	be	understood	as	awareness	of	
foreign	subjectivity.	It	was	suggested	in	Section	3	that,	for	Husserl,	empathic	
perception	is	an	awareness	of	another	person.	Characteristic	of	this	other	per-
son	is	that	he	or	she	is	a	unified	whole,	one	that	is	nevertheless	an	expressive	
whole,	that	is,	that	bears	two	intertwined	dimensions,	a	bodily	“expression”	
of	subject	and	a	subject	“expressed”	bodily.	Furthermore,	I	suggested	in	Part	
4	that	the	subject	“expressed”	in	the	personal	whole	perceived	comes,	or	may	
come	through	an	explicatory	shift,	to	thematic	focus	in	such	a	manner	that	his	
or	her	lived	experiences	may	be	thematically	grasped	in	their	own	contents	
and	their	own	specific	character	as	intentional	conscious	acts.	But	in	none	of	
these	accomplishments	does	 the	empathizing	subject	coincide	with	 the	one	
empathized.	As	Husserl	underlines,	all	that	I	empathize	in	the	other	refers	to	
an	‘I’	which	is	manifest	to	itself	in	essentially	the	same	manner	which	I	am	
to	myself.	But	this	self-manifestation,	however,	is	utterly	transcendent	of	my	
own,	and	that	this	transcendent	self-manifestation	is	intended	in	empathy,	and	
in	a	manner	which	fundamentally	determines	its	character	as	an	act,	under-
lines	both	the	alterity	and	the	subjectivity	of	the	other	of	empathy.
But	to	what	extent	do	Husserl’s	and	Stein’s	analyses	permit	talk	of	empathy	as	
a	mode	of	intuitive experience?	If	the	perceived	material	object	is,	in	a	sense,	
relatively	unproblematic	as	an	example	of	the	intuitively	given,	in	virtue	of	
the	sensuously	apparent	being	part	of	a	the	thing	itself,	and	the	latter	being	
a	totality	which	could	in	principle	show	itself	fully	by	means	of	futural	per-
spectival	appearances,	the	other	personal-subjective	life	is	intuitively	present	
only	in	a	somewhat	enigmatic	sense.	Empathy	is	intuitive	insofar	as	it	is	that	
mode	of	experience	by	which	the	subject	achieves,	through	the	two	moments	
of	perception	and	explication,	a	sui generis	grasp	of	a	transcendent	personal-
subjective	life,	in	its	transcendence	and	yet	also,	to	a	certain	extent,	its	deter-
minate	comportment.	Yet	what	this	intuitive	givenness	of	the	other	essentially	
requires	 is	 a	 persistently	 non-original	moment.	While	 the	 other	 is	 directly	
grasped	as	a	self-manifesting	intentional	life	–	in	the	sense	that	this	grasping	
is	an	essential	aspect	of	the	intuitive	experience	of	the	other	person	–	the	oth-
er’s	experiential	life	may	never	be	lived	through	in	the	most	basic	and	origi-
nary	sense.	But	this	is	a	necessary	absence	since,	as	we	saw	in	Section	2,	if	
it	were	so	lived	through	the	other	would	cease	to	be	other	and	would	become	
12
Cf.	Carr	1987:	270.
13
In	 fact,	 both	 Husserl	 and	 Stein	 distinguish	
between	 different	 levels	 of	 empathy,	 with	
the	most	 basic	 experiential	 achievement	 be-
ing	a	passively	occurring	apperception	of	the	
other’s	body	as	a	 living	body	which	 senses,	
and	 they	maintain	 that	 on	 this	 primitive	 ex-
periential	level	there	is	not	yet	the	expression	
of	Geist,	 that	 the	 other	 is	 not	 here	 encoun-
tered	as	a	subject	of	intentional	activity	(Stein	
2008:	 74–79	 [1989:	 56–61],	Husserl	 1973a:	
455–457).	But	the	recognition	of	such	levels	
need	 not	motivate	 the	 denial	 of	 the	 claim	 I	
have	 been	 attributing	 to	 them	 here,	 namely	
that	 in	 personalistic	 empathy	 the	 other	 is	
experienced	 as	 an	 embodied	 and	 intentional	
mind	“without	further	ado”,	since	this	thesis	
is	 entirely	 compatible	with	 a	more	 nuanced	
understanding	 of	 the	 various	 intentions	 and	
motivational	 relationships	 inherent	 within	
personalistic	 empathy.	 Indeed	 a	 complete	
account	 of	 the	 phenomenology	 of	 empathy	
would	certainly	need	 to	 incorporate	 such	an	
understanding.	For	further	discussion	of	 this	
issue,	see	Zahavi	(2014a).
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one	with	me.	Thus	for	the	other’s	self-presence	to	be	grasped	as	the other’s	it	
cannot	be	given	but	only	comprehended	or	recognized,	yet	this	recognition	is	
already	achieved	in	the	experience	of	the	other	person’s	expressivity.14	It	thus	
seems	that	empathy	achieves	a	coincidence	between	experiential	insight	and	
the	recognition	of	transcendence,	or	between	direct	intuition	and	alterity,	and	
that	Husserl	is	on	firm	ground	when	he	writes	as	follows:
“Just	as	what	is	past	can	be	originally	given	as	past	only	through	memory,	and	what	is	to	come	
in	the	future	can	as	such	only	be	originally	given	through	expectation,	the	foreign	can	only	be	
originally	given	as	 foreign	 through	empathy.	Original	givenness	 in	 this	 sense	 is	 the	same	as	
experience.”	(Husserl	1959:	176)
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James Jardine
Husserl i Stein o fenomenologiji empatije: percepcija i eksplikacija
Sažetak
U fenomenološkoj tradiciji često se nalaze hrabre tvrdnje da je interpersonalno razumijevanje uko-
rijenjeno u sui	generis obliku intencionalnog iskustva, koji se najčešće naziva empatijom (Einfüh-
lung). Ovaj rad istražuje te tvrdnje, naglašujući njihov specifičan karakter, te ispituje fenomenološ-
ka razmatranja u obrani tih tvrdnji koje su ponudili dva istaknuta zagovaratelja, Edmund Husserl i 
Edith Stein. U drugome dijelu, nakon iznošenja nekih uvodnih indikacija kako bi se empatija uopće 
trebala razumijevati, pažnju pridajem nekim karakterizacijama specifične strukture empatije, uzi-
majući u obzir u trećemu poglavlju huserlovsku tvrdnju da su neki oblici empatije opažajne naravi, 
te u četvrtome poglavlju inzistiranje Edith Stein da empatičko iskustvo često uključuje eksplici-
ranje intencionalnih iskustava drugih. Peto poglavlje zaključujem s procjenom razine do koje 
njihove analize podupiru shvaćanje empatije kao intuitivnog iskustva drugih umova.
Ključne	riječi
empatija,	percepcija,	interpersonalno	razumijevanje,	Edmund	Husserl,	Edith	Stein
James Jardine
Husserl und Stein zur Phänomenologie der Empathie: Perzeption und Explikation
Zusammenfassung
Innerhalb der phänomenologischen Tradition findet man häufig die gewagte Behauptung, das 
interpersonale Verständnis sei in der Sui-generis-Form der intentionalen Erfahrung verwurzelt, 
die meistens als Empathie (Einfühlung) bezeichnet wird. Die vorliegende Arbeit erforscht diese 
Behauptung, indem sie ihren distinktiven Charakter hervorhebt und phänomenologische Betrach-
tungen examiniert, die zu ihrer Verteidigung deren zwei Hauptbefürworter, Edmund Husserl und 
Edith Stein, vorgebracht haben. Nachdem ich im zweiten Teil einige vorbereitende Hinweise ange-
bracht habe, darüber, wie man Empathie auslegen sollte, widme ich mich danach einigen Charak-
terisierungen ihrer distinktiven Struktur, indem ich im dritten Teil die husserlsche These betrachte, 
bestimmte Formen der Empathie seien in ihrer Natur perzeputell, und im vierten Teil Steins Beste-
hen darauf, dass die empathische Erfahrung oftmals Explikationen eigener intentionaler Erfah-
rungen anderer enthält. Teil fünf schließt mit der Beurteilung ab, in welchem Umfang ihre Analysen 
die Auffassung der Empathie als einer intuitiven Erfahrung anderer Verstande unterstützen.
Schlüsselwörter
Empathie,	Perzeption,	interpersonales	Verständnis,	Edmund	Husserl,	Edith	Stein
James Jardine
Husserl et Stein sur la phénoménologie de l’empathie : perception et explication
Résumé
Dans la tradition phénoménologique, on trouve souvent qu’il est audacieux d’affirmer que la 
compréhension interpersonnelle soit enracinée dans une forme sui	generis de l’expérience inten-
tionnelle, désignée généralement comme empathie (Einfühlung). L’article suivant explore cette 
affirmation, en soulignant son caractère distinctif et en examinant les considérations phénomé-
nologiques que proposent en sa défense deux de ses principaux partisans, Edmund Husserl et 
Edith Stein. Après avoir proposé dans la partie 2 quelques indications préliminaires sur comment 
l’empathie devrait être comprise, je me tourne ensuite vers quelques descriptions de la structure 
caractéristique de celle-ci, en considérant, dans la partie 3, l’affirmation husserlienne d’après 
laquelle certaines formes d’empathies sont de nature perceptive, puis dans la partie 4, l’insis-
tance d’Edith Stein sur le fait que l’expérience empathique implique souvent l’explication des 
expériences intentionnelles propres à l’autre. La partie 5 conclura en évaluant jusqu’où leurs 
analyses soutiennent une conception d’empathie comme expérience intuitive des autres esprits.
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